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I study whether money growth targeting leads to indeterminacy in the
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gered indeterminacy during the Great Inflation. I show that ‘passively’
pursuing money growth objectives generates significantly larger welfare
loss compared to alternative specifications of the monetary policy rule
but ‘active’ money growth targeting drastically minimizes welfare loss. I
confirm the relationship between money growth objectives and macroe-
conomic volatility using cross-country evidence.
Keywords: Money Growth Objectives, Time-Varying Policy, Indeterminacy,
Macroeconomic Volatility
JEL classification: E41, E42, E51, E52, E58, E61, E65, O50
∗I am extremely grateful to Thijs van Rens and Marija Vukotic for their excellent guid-
ance. I thank Roberto Pancrazi, Michael McMahon, Olivier Coibion, Krisztina Molnar,
Marcus Miller, Leonardo Melosi, Ludger Linnemann, Izabela Sobiech, Olivier Loisel and
seminar participants at the University of Warwick, RGS Doctoral Conference, Theories and
Methods in Macroeconomics Conference, Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and Inter-
national Finance, GdRE International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance, and the
Lahore University of Management Sciences for their useful comments. I also thank Olivier
Coibion for sharing his data. Remaining errors are my own.
†Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL,
i.a.qureshi@warwick.ac.uk
1
1. Introduction
The dramatic rise in the volatility of output and inflation experienced by the
U.S. economy during the 1960s and 1970s followed by a substantial reduction
in the 1980s, has been a source of significant debate. Particular attention has
been given to examining the role of monetary policy in generating this Great
Moderation in macroeconomic activity. Clarida et al. (1998a) suggest that
the inability of the Federal Reserve (‘the Fed’) to raise nominal interest rates
more than one-for-one with inflation, that is, satisfy the Taylor (1999) princi-
ple, induced self-fulfilling expectations-driven fluctuations. This caused price
level indeterminacy, leading to macroeconomic instability. Volcker marked his
appointment as Chairman of the Fed with a strong response to inflation and
a switch from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ policy rule, ensuring price equilibrium
determinacy and a subsequent increase in macroeconomic stability.
Yet evidence presented by Orphanides (2002) using the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee’s (FOMC) meeting level data did not detect large changes in
the Fed’s response to inflation when comparing the period before and after
Volcker’s appointment. This has raised questions about how monetary policy
contributed to the difference in macroeconomic instability observed between
the two periods. Since under these policy rules a strong response to inflation is
not a sufficient condition of active policy, other policy objectives may also have
had a part in achieving price equilibrium determinacy. For example, previous
work illustrating the behaviour of monetary policy during the 1970s ignores the
impact of M1 targeting1 as a possible channel that may have induced passive
policy despite the FOMC’s strong response to inflation.
Although M1 targeting2 was never a formal goal, during the committee
meeting of January 1970 the FOMC decided that ‘[an] increased stress should
be placed on the objective of achieving modest growth in the monetary ag-
1I use the terms M1 targeting, intermediate targeting of money, M1 growth targeting,
monetarism and pursuit of money growth objectives interchangeably.
2Although the Fed set targets for the growth of three different monetary aggregates, the
centre of attention was the narrow money stock, M1 (Friedman (1996)).
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gregates’. The policy directive from the second FOMC meeting instructed the
manager of the System Open Market Account (SOMA) to ‘seek first and fore-
most a pattern of growth in a subset of monetary aggregates’, and to main-
tain ‘money-market conditions consistent with this objective’.3 The FOMC
paid close attention to growth in monetary aggregates as possible information
variables, as discussed in Mishkin (2007). In effect, the FOMC acted as if
controlling M1 was an objective of monetary policy, and directed the SOMA
manager to steer the Federal funds rate to keep its money growth objectives on
track (see, for example, Kane (1974), Meulendyke (1988), Larkin et al. (1988)
and Friedman (1996)). Empirical evidence of this change in objectives has
been presented in DeRosa and Stern (1977), wherein M1 is detected to have
influenced the setting of interest rates in the early 1970s, compared to its less
significant role during the late 1960s.
It is plausible, then, that a change in M1 objectives shifted monetary policy
from active to passive and triggered indeterminacy, irrespective of the FOMC’s
relatively strong response towards inflation, explaining the conflicting conclu-
sions presented in Clarida et al. (1998a) and Orphanides (2002). The increase
in macroeconomic instability observed during the Great Inflation could be at-
tributed to the incompatibility of the Fed’s money growth (M1) objectives
with its other goals which, when finally abandoned under Chairman Volcker,
gradually shifted the U.S. economy towards determinacy. However, macroeco-
nomic consequences of this monetary policy regime have not been studied due
to a lack of evidence of M1 targeting within a Taylor type rule using real-time
data.
In this paper I investigate the contribution of money growth as an objective
of monetary policy. Specifically, I focus on the macroeconomic instability
that pursuing this type of policy generates, using the U.S. as a case study.
First, I derive theoretical conditions that pin down price level equilibrium in a
standard New Keynesian model. In this environment, price level determinacy
depends on the monetary policy response coefficients and on the behaviour of
3For example, the Federal funds rate and discount window borrowing (Karamouzis and
Lombra (1989)).
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money demand. Second, I use novel meeting-level FOMC data on M1 growth
to provide novel empirical evidence of changes in the objectives of monetary
policy. Third, I combine my theoretical results with this evidence to capture
the contribution of changes in policy objectives to the instability in the US
economy. I show that this policy may have generated a significant welfare loss
in steady state consumption, giving a raison d’être for the Fed’s switch from
this type of monetary regime in the early 1980s.
I offer a new perspective on the impact of money growth objectives and the
money demand relationship on price level determinacy. I show that when the
reaction function contains a money growth objective, the relationship between
nominal money and inflation contributes to the likelihood of determinacy, op-
erating independently of the relationship between nominal money, output and
the interest rate. Alternatively, when the nominal money and inflation chan-
nel is stable, a weak response to money growth also triggers indeterminacy,
irrespective of whether the Taylor principle is satisfied. A key implication of
this result is that under these two scenarios, it is desirable for the monetary
authority to switch to an inflation-targeting regime to achieve price level de-
terminacy. The price level determinacy results derived in this paper extend
the results presented in Keating and Smith (2013) by highlighting the critical
relationship between nominal money and inflation in ensuring price level deter-
minacy when the monetary authority pursues money growth objectives. My
results contribute to the theoretical literature which has so far only focused
on the response towards inflation as a pre-requisite of active policy (see for ex-
ample Friedman (2000), Woodford (2001) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003)).
Second, I use extended FOMC data on M1 growth4 to estimate a time-
varying monetary policy rule from 1970 through to 1987. By allowing mone-
tary targets to enter as an objective of policy, my empirical evidence highlights
a unique type of loose and volatile monetary policy, which is quite different
4A quarter of the series from 1970 - 1975 is taken from Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), while
the rest of the series from 1976 through to 1987 is collected from policy directives and the
Greenbook forecasts. The FOMC stopped setting M1 targets during the second meeting of
1987.
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from that implied in Orphanides (2002) and Boivin (2005). The coefficient
on M1 is estimated to be statistically significant from 1970 to late 1974, and
from 1979 through to late 1981, which is consistent with the observation that
the FOMC under Burns paid more attention to money growth in the early
1970s (Burns (1987), and Sims and Zha (2006)). Additionally, the negative
coefficient on M1 is consistent with the findings of Benati and Mumtaz (2007),
Friedman (1996), and Friedman et al. (1996) from 1979 through to 1981. The
negative coefficient on money growth is also consistent with the findings of
Canova and Menz (2011). Compared to Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
and Boivin (2005), the coefficient on inflation is marginally lower, falling grad-
ually throughout the sample and rising sharply in the 1980s. Simliar to their
findings, this coefficient is greater than one for the entire sample.
To test the likelihood of the US economy being in a determinate equilibrium
from 1970 through to 1987, I combine the empirical distribution of the esti-
mated policy and money demand coefficients with a parameterized New Key-
nesian model. My results suggest a high likelihood of indeterminacy during
the first half of the 1970s and during Volcker’s deflation, and a high likelihood
of price level determinacy from the 1980s. These results are closer to the impli-
cations forwarded by Clarida et al. (1998a), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) than the conclusions reached by Orphanides (2002), and suggest that
the monetary policy reaction function is the primary driving factor generating
price level indeterminacy during the Great Inflation. Contrary to their frame-
work, I show that the weak response to money growth mitigates the relatively
strong response to inflation, rendering monetary policy passive and triggering
indeterminacy. My results suggests that analyzing monetary policy in pre and
post Volcker characterization may be misleading, as multiple policy regimes are
estimated to have occurred during the 1970s, supporting the results presented
in Sims and Zha (2006), Bianchi (2012) and Lubik et al. (2014).
Last, I consider the role of monetary growth objectives as a potential source
of the additional macroeconomic volatility observed during the 1960s and the
1970s, and present welfare-based evidence in support of a switch to a Taylor
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type policy rule. My findings suggest that a sizeable portion of the reduc-
tion in macroeconomic volatility in the 1980s may be attributed to monetary
policy, supporting the claims made by Roberts (2006), Leduc and Sill (2007)
and Taylor (2013). I show that the countries that pursue money growth ob-
jectives equivalent to the U.S are found to have significantly higher output
and inflation volatility as compared to countries that pursue only inflation as
an objective of policy. My findings suggest that countries that pursue money
growth objectives similar to the U.S may attain significant welfare gains by
switching to a Taylor type specification.
In the next section I outline the model, the determinacy conditions implied
by a monetary policy rule with money growth objectives, and the baseline
parameterization. Section 3 presents empirical evidence of money growth ob-
jectives using a time-varying specification, and estimates of a money demand
curve, which are then used to calculate the likelihood of determinacy. The
contribution to macroeconomic volatility, and the welfare loss implied by each
monetary policy specification, is also enumerated. In section 4, I present inter-
national evidence of monetary aggregate targeting. Section 5 concludes, with
suggestions for future research.
2. Model, Parameterization and Determi-
nacy
To derive the conditions that pin down price level determinacy under a policy
rule which has a money growth objective, I utilize a prototypical New Key-
nesian DSGE model developed by Walsh (2003), Galí (2009) and Woodford
(2011). This model is a suitable baseline framework for analyzing monetary
policy due to the presence of staggered pricing.
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2.1. The Structural Model
Two equations, a dynamic Phillips curve and the dynamic IS curve, are derived
from the optimality conditions of a continuum of household and firms:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + gt (1)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + ut (2)
where pit is inflation and xt is the output gap.5 Equation 1 is the log-
linearized Euler condition, where the output gap is negatively related to the
difference between the nominal interest rate, it, and positively related to ex-
pected inflation, pit+1. Due to the intertemporal substitution effect, higher
real returns induce greater savings, depressing aggregate demand. Expecta-
tions of a positive output gap expand the current output gap, as economic
agents prefer to smooth their consumption. Since the underlying model has
no investment, output is proportional to consumption in equilibrium. Aggre-
gate output is subject to a shock gt that can be interpreted as a shock to
government spending, or as a shock to the household preferences. Equation
2 is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which relates inflation in the
current period to expectations of inflation and the output gap. In the NKPC,
β is the discount factor, and κ is a convolution of the structural parameters
which include a Calvo (1983) style staggered pricing mechanism. ut represents
an exogenous cost-push shock, such as those related to unexpected changes in
oil prices. To track money, I use an extended money demand equation from
Stock and Watson (1993):
mnt = ηpipt + ηxyt − ηiit + τt (3)
Similar to Mehra (1991) and Söderström (2001), I take first differences to
5Lowercase letters denote the natural logs of the corresponding variable as presented in
(Galí (2009)).
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obtain an expression for the growth rate of the nominal money stock:
∆mnt = ηpipit + ηx∆yt − ηi∆it + ∆τt (4)
∆mnt is the log change in the nominal money stock and ∆yt is growth in
actual output. τt captures exogenous money demand shocks and ηj for j ∈
(pi, i, y) represents the (semi-)elasticity of nominal money growth of each of
these variables. Based on the implications of the quantity theory of money ηpi
is generally normalized to one, but this relationship may change over time.6
With this equation I can track short run departures from traditional money
demand relationships between nominal money, inflation, interest rates and
output (see, for example, Lucas (1980)).
I close the model with a monetary authority that sets the nominal interest
rates. The baseline specification for the monetary policy reaction function is a
generalized Taylor rule, and includes a response to growth in broad monetary
aggregates such as M1. Money growth objectives may be linked with policy
goals in the long run, but with short-run deviations in these relationships. In
this sense, the nominal rate may be adjusted when growth in money is exceed-
ing or falling from a long run target (see, for example, Meulendyke (1988),
Larkin et al. (1988) and Karamouzis and Lombra (1989)).7 Consequently, a
meeting-specific feedback rule which captures the forward-looking behaviour
6This argument has also been considered in Stock and Watson (1993), who test if ηpi = 1
using annual and quarterly U.S. data using equation 3.
7On the operational side, the target range of interest rate is decided during an FOMC
meeting, directing the System Open Market (SOMA) manager to adjust security transac-
tions in order to maintain the interest rate within that range (Kane (1974)). During the
1970 - 1979 period, the operating target was the federal funds rate, and nominal money
aggregates played a role in influencing the setting of this policy rate, in order to keep mon-
etary policy consistent with long run objectives. In this setting, the Federal funds rate
is determined by the position of the bank reserves, which combined with the cash in the
economy times the money multiplier gives an estimate of money supply. It has been argued
that broad money growth is not perfectly under the control of the monetary authority, and
the large fluctuations in money demand must be accommodated, Goodhart (1994).
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of the Fed can be written as follows:
it = ρ1,tit−1+ρ2,tit−2+(1−ρ1,t−ρ2,t)[ψpi,tEtpit+j+ψx,tEtxt+j+ψm,tEt∆mnt+j]+ct+t
(5)
for j ∈ (0, 1, ..); t is an error term. I compare this baseline case with Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011), under which the reaction function takes the fol-
lowing functional form:
it = ρ1,tit−1+ρ2,tit−2+(1−ρ1,t−ρ2,t)[ψpiEtpit+j+ψxEtxt+j+ψgyEtgyt+j]+ct+t
(6)
The structural shocks, gt, ut, and τt and the exogenous policy shock t are all
assumed to follow a mean zero AR(1) process, characterised by persistence ρ,
and shock variance, σ.
2.2. Equilibrium Determinacy Under Money
Growth Objectives
To study the equilibrium properties of the baseline monetary policy rule when
the central bank responds to inflation, output and to a broad measure of a
monetary aggregate, I derive the price level determinacy conditions.8 First, I
derive a baseline price level determinacy condition for the general policy rule,
and then focus on the different combinations of simple rules.
8One may question whether commitment to an interest rate rule of this kind, incorporat-
ing no target path for any monetary aggregate, can serve to determine an equilibrium price
level at all. According to the well-known critique of Sargent and Wallace (1975), interest
rate rules as such are undesirable, as they lead to indeterminacy of the rational expectations
equilibrium price level. However, their analysis assumes a rule that specifies an exogenous
path for the short-term nominal interest rate; determinacy is instead possible in the case of
feedback from an endogenous state variable such as the price level, as noted by McCallum
(1981). In fact, many simple optimizing models imply that the Taylor rule incorporates
feedback of a sort that suffices to ensure determinacy, owing to the dependence of the funds
rate operating target upon recent inflation and output-gap measures.
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2.2.1. A General Determinacy Condition
Under the baseline rule, the conditions outlined in Woodford (2011) can be
used to derive the necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees price level
determinacy:
Proposition 1: Determinacy condition for rules with money growth
objectives For any β ∈ (0, 1), and any κ > 0, if the monetary authority fol-
lows the policy rule it = ρ1it−1 + ρ2it−2 + (1− ρ1− ρ2)(ψpiEtpit+j +ψxEtxt+j +
ψ∆mEt∆m
N
t+j), the following conditions are sufficient for determinacy:
(βσ)−1(δ4(1− β) + κ(δ3 − 1) + δ5(1− β) + (δ1 + δ2)κ) > 0 (7)
− (βσ)−1((δ4 − δ5)(1 + β) + κδ3 + (δ1 − δ2 + 1)(κ+ 2σ + 2βσ)) < 0 (8)
where δi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are convolutions of the policy parameters and
structural parameters underlying the transmission mechanism:
δ1 =
ρ1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2) δ2 =
ρ2
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
δ3 =
(1− ρ1 − ρ2)(ψpi + ηpiψ∆m)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2) δ4 =
(ηxψ∆m + ψx)(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
δ5 = − ηxψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
Proof: See appendix A.3.2
Next, I discuss price level determinacy under various combinations of the mon-
etary policy rule.
2.2.2. Responding to Output Gap and Inflation
Assume first that the monetary authority only responds to inflation and the
output gap. This familiar policy rule can be written:
it = ψpipit + ψxxt (9)
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The necessary and sufficient conditions under this policy rule can be ob-
tained by setting ψ∆m, ρ1 and ρ2 equal to zero in condition 7.9
(1− β)ψx + κ(ψpi − 1) > 0 (10)
As discussed in Galí (2009) and Woodford (2011) this feedback rule satisfies
the Taylor principle since it implies that in the event of a sustained increase
in the inflation rate of k percent, the nominal interest rate will eventually be
raised by more than k percent. In particular, the coefficient values associated
with the classic Taylor (1993) rule (ψpi = 1.5, ψx = 0.5) necessarily satisfy the
criterion, regardless of the size of β and κ. Thus feedback from the Taylor rule
suffices to determine an equilibrium price level.
2.2.3. Responding to Money Growth and Inflation
To analyze price level determinacy conditions when the monetary authority
responds to inflation and money growth, the following policy rule is considered:
it = ψpipit + ψ∆m∆m
N
t (11)
Setting ρ1, ρ2, and ψx equal to zero in condition 7 yields the following novel
proposition:
Proposition 2: Extension of the Taylor principle For any β ∈ (0, 1),
and any κ > 0, ηi ≥ 0 and ηx ≥ 0, if the central bank follows the simple rule
it = ψpipit + ψ∆m∆m
N
t , this condition is sufficient for determinacy:
ηpiψ∆m + ψpi > 1 (12)
Thus, the likelihood of determinacy is affected by the response to money
9We can ignore the second determinacy condition for this case, since expression 8 will boil
down to a condition where the sum of two positive policy parameters and three structural
parameters (which are positive by assumption).
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growth and the stability in the relationship between nominal money and in-
flation irrespective of the Taylor principle being satisfied. Setting ψ∆m = 0,
for any parameterization of the money demand, or setting the money demand
to zero for any parameterization of ψ∆m, condition 12 collapses to the Taylor
principle:
ψpi > 1 (13)
Therefore, under condition 13, the monetary authority should switch its focus
to inflation in order to guarantee price level determinacy when the money
demand relationship has become unstable, or when the monetary authority is
unable to respond sufficiently strongly to money growth.
Next, I focus on the general price level determinacy condition, in equation
12. To consider the implications for the nominal rate under the policy rule
specified in equation 11, assume a permanent increase in inflation of size dpi:
di = ψpidpi + ψ∆md∆m (14)
Simplifying the money demand relationship described in equation 3, the change
in the nominal interest rates can be captured by:
di = (ψpi + ηpiψ∆m)dpi (15)
Condition 12 is equivalent to the term in brackets in equation 15 being greater
than one, implying that the price level equilibrium will be unique under interest
rate rule 11 whenever ψpi and ψ∆m are sufficiently large (or are of the same
sign) to guarantee that the real interest rate rises in the face of an increase in
inflation of size dpi. Moreover, since price level determinacy depends on the
cumulative response to money growth and inflation, the response to money
growth only matters relative to the response to inflation. This is important
since interest rates may respond negatively to money growth, as empirically
estimated in Friedman (1996) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007). When nominal
money growth and inflation are characterized by a unitary relationship (i.e.,
when ηpi = 1), and the monetary authority chooses to respond only to money
12
growth, then ψ∆m > 1 also guarantees determinacy, since real interest rates
rise more than inflation according to equation 18. This condition is similar
to the determinacy condition outlined in Keating and Smith (2013), but is
generalized to allow for variation in ηpi.
The determinacy regions under multiple parameterizations of ηpi are shown
in Figure 1. First, when ηpi ∈ (0, 1) the determinacy region shrinks, since
the relationship between nominal money and inflation deteriorates. Only a
greater response to money growth mitigates this channel, conditional on the
same response towards inflation. For ηpi > 1, the central bank benefits from
the stable transmission mechanism. Given the same response towards infla-
tion, a relatively lower response towards money growth is required to achieve
price level determinacy. When ηpi is negative, a stronger response towards
inflation,10 or the opposite sign on money growth would be required to guar-
antee price level determinacy. Critically, when ηpi is restricted to zero, then
any response to monetary growth does not guarantee determinacy and only
a strong response to inflation, of magnitude greater than one (i.e. the Taylor
principle), can guarantee price level determinacy. These results differ from
Keating and Smith (2013), as the relationship between nominal money and
inflation is crucial for determinacy, and plays an important role even when the
relationship between nominal money, output, and interest rates is stable or
unstable.11
10Specifically, the response needs to be of magnitude 1 + ηpiψ∆m.
11Note that the determinacy conditions studied in this section are based on the restriction
ηi ≥ 0, ηx ≥ 0, and which includes the scenario where these relationships might break down
(i.e., when ηi = 0 and ηx = 0).
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Figure 1: Determinacy regions when ηpi is allowed to vary
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = 1
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = 1.5
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = 2
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = 0
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = -1
ψ
∆ m
0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ
pi
0
1
2
3
4
5
η
pi
 = -1.5
This figure presents determinacy regions based on the feedback rule where the central bank
responds to inflation and monetary growth. The plots consider the effect on the determinacy
region when the relationship between nominal money growth and inflation is allowed to vary.
The (dark) shaded blue area represents the indeterminacy regions.
2.2.4. Interest Rate Smoothing
Last, I analyze the case where the monetary authority responds to money
growth and partially smoothes interest rates. Clarida et al. (1998b) show that
incorporating a partial-adjustment mechanism to the original Taylor (1993)
rule helps improve the fit of the actual variation in the nominal interest rate
observed in the U.S economy and some large European economies. This is
a weighted average between lagged nominal interest rate and the Taylor-type
targeting rate, and can be extended to explore the determinacy conditions
14
when the monetary authority only pursues money growth objectives:
it = ρ1it−1 + ψ∆m∆mt (16)
Proposition 3: Money targeting and interest rate smoothing For
any β ∈ (0, 1), and any κ > 0 if the central bank follows the simple rule
it = ρ1it + ψ∆m∆mt, the following condition is sufficient for determinacy:12
ψ∆m + ρ1 > 1 (17)
This result can be obtained by setting ρ2, ψx and ψpi equal to zero in equation
7. As before, consider the implications for the nominal rate under the monetary
policy rule defined in equation 17 if there was a permanent increase in inflation
of size dpi.
di =
ψ∆m
1− ρ1d∆m (18)
If condition 17 is satisfied, then the condition ψ∆m
1−ρ1 is greater than one, and is
enough to guarantee that the real interest rises in the face of an increase in
inflation. This tends to counteract the increase in inflation of magnitude dpi,
and acts as a stabilizing force. Figure 2 plots the determinacy region for this
result.
12For the remainder of this section, I assume a stable money demand relationship, since
the case where the relationship is unstable follows exactly the same intuition discussed in
the previous subsection.
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Figure 2: Determinacy regions under interest rate smoothing
ψ
∆ m
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
ρ
1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
This figure presents determinacy conditions based on the feedback rule where the central
bank responds only to money growth, and under partial interest rate smoothing. The (dark)
shaded blue area represents the indeterminacy region.
2.3. Parameterization
The baseline parameterization of the model takes the relevant value to corre-
spond to a quarter, and primarily relies on the values presented in Galí (2009).
β is set to 0.99 which is standard in the literature on business cycle models in
the U.S. I assume that households’ preferences can be represented by a log util-
ity function, which implies σ = 1 and unitary Frisch elasticity, ϕ = 1, α = 1/3
and  = 6. The average price duration is assumed to be three quarters, which
implies that θ = 2/3. The money demand function, the parameters ηpi, ηx
and ηi are all normalized to one in the baseline case. The parameters for the
exogenous shocks, cost-push, productivity and monetary policy are taken from
16
the estimation in Smets and Wouters (2007) for the 1984 through to the 2004
sample, and the aggregate demand shock is calibrated with the value used by
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Finally, the money demand shock is parameter-
ized with the value discussed in Galí (2009). Table 1 summarizes the baseline
parameterization, split into structural and shock parameters, which are used
to simulate the model.
Table 1: Baseline parameterization
Structural Shocks
Parameter Value Source Parameter Value Source
β 0.99 Galí (2009) ρa 0.94 Smets and Wouters (2007)
σ 1 Galí (2009) ρv 0.29 Smets and Wouters (2007)
ϕ 1 Galí (2009) ρg 0.7 Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
α 1/3 Galí (2009) ρu 0.74 Smets and Wouters (2007)
 6 Galí (2009) ρτ 0.6 Galí (2009)
θ 2/3 Galí (2009) σa 0.35 Smets and Wouters (2007)
ηx 1 Galí (2009) σv 0.12 Smets and Wouters (2007)
ηi 1 Galí (2009) σg 0.38 Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
ηpi 1 Galí (2009) σu 0.11 Smets and Wouters (2007)
στ 0.63 Galí (2009)
The table presents the baseline parameterization of the model. All values are adapted to
the quarterly frequency of the model.
3. Monetary Growth Objectives during
the 1970s
In this section, I construct the likelihood of the U.S. economy being in a
determinate equilibrium. I combine the theoretical determinacy conditions
with empirical estimates of the policy rule, beginning with estimating a time-
varying parameter version of the baseline monetary policy reaction function.
Since money demand parameters influence determinacy in this framework, I
also estimate a generalized version of the money demand curve. I combine
these empirical results with the theoretical determinacy conditions to assess
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the implications on price level equilibrium. This captures the contribution of
changes in monetary policy objectives that may have moved the economy into
an indeterminate equilibrium during the Great Inflation: after this policy was
abandoned under Chairman Volcker the economy shifted back to a determinate
equilibrium. Last, I show that pursuing money growth objectives generated
high macroeconomic volatility, and therefore significantly higher welfare losses,
than would have occurred under a Taylor type specification.
3.1. Empirical evidence
3.1.1. Estimating the monetary policy reaction function
My baseline specification for the FOMC’s reaction function is a generalized
Taylor rule. This interest rate rule allows for interest smoothing of order two,
a response to inflation, output gap and nominal money growth.
it = ρ1,tit−1 +ρ2,tit−2 +(1−ρ1,t−ρ2,t)[ψpi,tpit+ψx,txt+ψm,t∆mt]+ ct+ t (19)
To estimate this equation, I use Greenbook forecasts of current and future
macroeconomic variables prepared by staff members of the Fed prior to each
FOMC meeting. For M1 growth, I use the series from 1970 through to 1975
presented in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), while the remainder of the series from
1975 through to 1987 is collected from the policy directives issued at the end
of the FOMC meeting, and is collected from the Minutes.13 The interest rate
is the target Federal funds rate set at each meeting; the measure of the output
gap and inflation is based on Greenbook forecasts, presented in Orphanides
(2002). I use a time-varying approach to estimate the policy coefficients, which
closely follows the techniques introduced in Boivin (2005). I assume that each
13The FOMC stopped setting targets for M1 in 1987, so the data sample ends on this
date.
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of the policy parameters is time-varying and follows a driftless random walk:14
Ωt = Ωt−1 + ωt (20)
Similar to Boivin (2005), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), I allow for
two breaks to accommodate the difference in volatility of the shocks during the
two periods, with one break in 1979 and the other in 1982. For comparison, I
also estimate the alternate case where the FOMC responds to output growth
instead of money growth. Figures 3 and 4 present the results.
14To deal with any possible endogeneity issues, IV estimates are included in the appendix.
Moreover, numerous tests were performed on meeting-level data to gauge the likelihood of
collinearity. Similar to earlier literature, I find no concerns that may influence my baseline
estimates. Second, I also compile a data set for M2 based on Greenbook/Policy directives,
and repeat this estimation. M2 enters with a positive sign from 1975. However, combining
the determinacy periods suggested by the policy rule with M2 does not change the results
of this paper. These results are available upon request.
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Figure 3: Baseline estimates of the reaction function
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The figure presents the time-varying estimate of the reaction function from 1970 through to
1987. The solid blue line plots estimates of the policy coefficients, while the dotted black
line plots standard errors. From the top, the first panel plots the coefficient on inflation, the
second panel plots the coefficient on money growth, and the third panel plots the coefficient
on output gap. The last panel plots the sum of the coefficients on the first and second lag
of interest rates.
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Figure 4: Estimated reaction function compared with Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2011)
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The figure presents the time-varying estimate of the reaction function from 1970 through
to 2000. The solid blue line plots estimates from the policy rule with money growth, while
the dashed red line plots estimates with output growth. From the top, the first panel plots
the coefficient on inflation, the second panel plots the coefficient on money growth, the
third panel plots the coefficient on output gap, and the fourth panel plots the coefficient on
output growth. The last panel plots the sum of the coefficients on the first and second lag
of interest rates.
The estimated coefficients suggest that monetary policy during this period
was procyclical, loose and volatile, and provides a unique interpretation of
the policy mistakes observed during the Great Inflation. First, the weight on
money growth is estimated to be negative throughout the sample, and is sta-
tistically significant from 1970 through to late 1974, and from 1979 through to
late 1981. The negative coefficient on money growth is consistent with Fried-
man (1996) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007). These estimates contribute to
21
the literature by formalizing the changes in FOMC’s objectives using meeting
level data, since the latter uses historical data on M2 to estimate their policy
rule, while the former does not find the coefficient on money growth to be
statistically significant for the entire sample. My findings from 1979 through
to 1982 are consistent with Friedman et al. (1996), who find a statistically sig-
nificant negative weight on M1 growth during this period. From late 1981, the
error bands include zero, suggesting that the FOMC stopped pursuing money
growth objectives around this period, and supporting the results presented by
Meulendyke (1998). In general, my results are consistent with the observation
that the FOMC paid more attention to money growth during the early 1970s,
as suggested in Burns (1987) and Sims and Zha (2006) and during Volcker’s
deflation, as suggested in Friedman et al. (1996). The negative coefficient on
money growth is also consistent with the findings of Canova and Menz (2011).
However, the behaviour of M1 targeting during the specific period considered
in this paper using new FOMC data is novel to this literature.
The coefficient on inflation gradually drifts down from the start of the
sample until the early 1980s, with the sharpest fall occurring between 1973 and
1974, and in general always stays below the coefficient estimated by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011). My estimates suggest that the Taylor principle
was weakly satisfied during this period, though standard errors include values
of the coefficient marginally lower than one. In the second half of 1980s there is
a sharp upward drift in the response to inflation, as it rises and remains there
for the rest of the sample. The weight on output gap is closer to the estimates
suggested in Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) and Orphanides (2002), and rises
continuously from 1970 through to 1977, falling gradually during Volcker’s
deflation. Similar to Kim and Nelson (2006), interest rates are estimated
to be volatile for the sample from 1970 through to 1981, but resemble the
estimates presented in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) for the remainder of
the sample. In general, my results are very different from the policy coefficients
estimated in Orphanides (2002), and point to a large variation in the policy
parameters during the 1970s and 1980s.
22
A number of factors could explain the behaviour of the FOMC during this
period. First, under this type of framework, the FOMC generally set a mon-
etary aggregate objective, and allowed the Federal funds rate to move up or
down if money was exceeding or falling short of its objective (Meulendyke
(1988)). Unexpected changes in the economy, such as aggregate demand
shocks, would cause the Federal funds rate to hit the top of its target band,
inducing the systems operation manager (SOMA) to conduct open market op-
erations (OMOs). This would cause bank reserves to rise and increase the
monetary base, causing money supply to rise. This is exactly what occurred
from June 1972 to June 1973 when the economy boomed unexpectedly, and
the opposite occurred at the end of June 1974 when the economy contracted,
as observed in Mishkin (2007). Overall, this meant that instead of raising
interest rates when monetary aggregates were outside the target range, in-
terest rates were lowered to keep them in the range, and broad money was
allowed to rise over and above the mandated objectives. In the 117 meet-
ings between 1970 through to 1987, targets for M1 growth and the Federal
funds moved in the opposite direction more than 80% of the time. The FOMC
never seemed to be in control of its money growth objectives, and they were
frequently missed (Mishkin (2007)), and never reversed (Kane (1974), Meu-
lendyke (1988), Larkin et al. (1988) and Mishkin (2007)). The stop-go nature
of monetary policy is epitomized by the volatility of interest rates, and the
lack of interest rate smoothing during this period. Since the FOMC was ag-
gressively pursuing its output objectives, money growth objectives would be
revised upwards, causing inflation to rise (the go phase). When the FOMC
attempted to reverse its decision, it either faced violent opposition from its
committee members15 who bowed to pressure from the Congress, or inflation
15Evidence in support of monetary easing is found in many of the statements by other
members. For example, Mr. MacLaury argues against policy tightening and says that the
‘directors of the Minneapolis Reserve Bank do not believe that discount rate action would
be appropriate at this time, but they do feel that - to use the words of Chairman Burns -
a modest and cautious easing of monetary policy would be desirable’ (Minutes, 12/18/73,
p. 81). At a later time, Mr. MacLaury warned of the political consequences of failing to
act against the coming economic slowdown (Minutes, 11/19/73, p. 18). During 1974, the
FOMCs gradualist monetary policy (Minutes, 01/21/74, page 20) combined with uncertainty
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expectations became embedded so that a large interest rate hike was required
but never took place. As soon as signs of a recession started building this
small period of active policy was reversed in favour of passive policy (the stop
phase) as documented by Goodfriend (2005).
Next, I compare the interest rate implied by the baseline estimates of the
reaction function that contain a money growth objective, with the estimated
coefficients provided by the specifications of the policy rule forwarded Taylor
(1993), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), and with actual interest rates set
by the FOMC. I derive a series for the interest rates based on the estimated
time-varying policy coefficients for each specification of the policy rule. This
allows me to evaluate the estimates that best explain the movement in inter-
est rates during the 1970s and 1980s. My estimates suggest that throughout
the pre-Volcker period, and during the early 1980s, interest rates implied by
the policy coefficients estimated with money growth objectives tracks the be-
haviour of interest rates better than any of the alternative monetary policy
rules. This exercise strongly suggests that a policy rule that takes into consid-
eration M1 growth in the setting of monetary policy during the 1970s better
explains actual interest rates observed during this period. The interest rates
based on the coefficients estimated using the specification presented by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) also fit the actual interest better than the specifi-
cation presented in Taylor (1993), but worse than the interest rates implied
by a specification that includes money growth. This is primarily because the
coefficients introduced in Taylor (1993) imply an interest rate that is higher
than actual interest rate during the 1970s. However, this specification tracks
the actual interest rates remarkably well for the second half of the data, from
1980 through to 1987. This raises the possibility of a gradual switch in objec-
tives during the early 1980s, since the interest rate implied by the policy rule
with money growth starts to drift lower than actual interest rates from this
period to the end of the sample. In general, my findings strongly suggest that
about the source of slack in the economy (Minutes, 6/18/74, p. 68), meant minor changes
in beliefs towards the response to inflation, which continue to drift down, and little change
in response to monetary aggregates, which falls consistently until about August 1974 before
starting to rise.
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the baseline policy rule estimated in this paper explains interest rates better
than any of the alternative policy rules during the Great Inflation. Figure 5
presents the interest rates implied by each of these specifications compared
with actual interest rates from 1970 through to 1987.
Figure 5: Interest rates based on estimated policy coefficients
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This graph compares the fit of the policy rule by comparing implied estimates of the interest
rate with the actual interest rate. The solid blue line is the actual interest rate during this
time period. The solid red line is the implied interest rate with the policy rule parameterized
with the baseline rule with money growth. The solid black line is based on the estimates of
the interest rate under a Taylor rule, and the dotted black line is the implied estimates of
the interest rate under estimates of the Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) policy rule.
Overall, the estimated coefficients of nominal money growth as an objective
of policy suggest a rich pattern in the evolution of monetary policy for the pe-
riod 1970 through to 1987. The changes in the policy parameters are distinctive
across regimes, especially the weight on money growth, which is statistically
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significant in two independent regimes. In this sense, the response on money
growth fluctuated within the subsample, suggesting a regime-dependent type
of monetary policy. The FOMC under Chairman Burns reveals an insuffi-
cient response to money growth, providing a novel interpretation of the policy
mistakes during the Great Inflation. An additional important contribution of
this section is that a monetary policy rule that includes money growth as an
objective of policy better fits movements in the interest rate during the Great
Inflation. Similar to most of the previous literature (see, for example, Boivin
(2005)), the largest changes in the parameters seemed to have occurred during
the period 1980 through to 1982.
3.1.2. Estimating the money demand function
Since indeterminacy in this framework is driven by the policy parameters and
the relationship between nominal money and inflation, a plausible parameteri-
zation of the money demand curve is crucial for pinning down the determinacy
regions. Stock and Watson (1993) estimate this type of generalized money
demand curve, which explicitly aims to capture the relationship between nom-
inal money and inflation. However, since their focus is primarily on the long
run money demand relationship, they ignore any short-term deviations from
longer-run estimates. In this context, I estimate a generalized version of the
money demand curve, focusing on the following specification of the money
demand equation introduced in section 2:16
mnt = c0 + β0pt + β1yt + β2it + τt (21)
Following Ireland (2009) and Stock and Watson (1993), I use quarterly data
on nominal money, M1,17 real net national product, the six-month commercial
16Alternately, I could estimate the log-differenced equation using the treatment introduced
in Mehra (1991).
17The difference in the results across literature could be driven by the development of
electronic payments which may suggest that M1 might not be the most appropriate monetary
aggregate to use in the second part of the sample Teles and Uhlig (2010). However, to
compare the behaviour of money demand across samples, I use M1 for all time periods.
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paper rate and the GDP price deflator for the estimation. I use the dynamic
OLS (DOLS) techniques developed in Stock and Watson (1993) to estimate
this specification. This method estimates a robust single equation approach,
which corrects for regressor endogeneity by the inclusion of leads and lags
of first differences of the regressors. In addition it has the same asymptotic
optimality properties as the Johansen distribution. In order to compare my
findings with the existing literature, I also estimate a specification of the money
demand when β1 and β2 is restricted to zero, and also when β0 is fixed to one.
Table 2 summarizes these estimates.
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Table 2: Estimates of money demand parameters
Point Estimates (Standard Errors)
Sample Lags & ηpi(= β0) ηy(= β1) ηi(= β2) c0
Leads
1960 - 2004 − 1.08∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.015) (0.30)
2 1.08∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.77
(0.07) (0.09) (0.005) (0.56)
3 1.08∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.72
(0.08) (0.11) (0.005) (0.70)
− 1.32∗∗∗ − − 1.14∗∗∗
(0.009) − − (0.034)
− − 0.48∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −1.70∗∗∗
− (0.01) (0.001) (0.09)
1960 - 1969 − 1.13∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.75∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.02) (0.002) (0.14)
2 1.82∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.43
(0.09) (0.03) (0.004) (0.27)
3 0.75∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗
(0.09) (0.03) (0.004) (0.30)
− 1.72∗∗∗ − − 0.03
(0.00) − − (0.00)
− − 0.33∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.63∗∗∗
− (0.013) (0.0016) (0.10)
1970 - 1979 − 0.58∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.00 −2.4∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.001) (0.42)
2 0.50∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ −0.00 −3.16∗∗
(0.05) (0.13) (0.002) (0.92)
3 0.46∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.00 −3.69∗
(0.08) (0.20) (0.002) (1.46)
− 0.93∗∗∗ − − 2.45∗∗∗
(0.00) − − (0.00)
− − −0.085∗ 0.002 2.93∗∗∗
− (0.03) (0.002) (0.31)
1982 - 2004 − 2.91∗∗∗ −1.00∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ 3.55∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.20) (0.004) (0.71)
2 2.84∗∗∗ −1.1∗∗∗ −0.010∗ 4.86∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.18) (0.004) (0.58)
3 2.81∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗ −0.010∗ 5.22∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.18) (0.004) (0.59)
− 1.85∗∗∗ − − −1.08∗∗∗
(0.05) − − (0.21)
− − 0.33∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.30
− (0.05) (0.004) (0.52)
The table presents estimates of the generalized money demand curve. Each row presents the
results from dynamic OLS, which includes the treatment introduced by Stock and Watson
(1993), with the first row using zero lags. I use Newey-West standard errors. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 denote significance levels.
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For the complete sample, there is sufficient evidence of a stable relationship
between nominal money and inflation, though this relationship changes across
periods, as also observed in Sargent and Surico (2011). There is convincing
evidence of a unitary relationship between nominal money and inflation from
1960 through to 1979, which weakens during the 1970s and becomes relatively
stronger from 1982 through to 2004. The relationship between nominal money
and interest rates also changes over time. There is little evidence of a liquidity
effect from 1960 through to 1979, and this relationship almost vanishes during
the period 1970 through to 1979. From 1960 through to 1969, there is a positive
contemporaneous relationship between money growth and interest rate growth
across all estimates, and significant evidence of the well known liquidity puzzle
(Gordon and Leeper (1994)). From 1982 through to 2004 there is evidence
of the liquidity effect, since the coefficient on interest rates is negative and
significant as well as similar to the estimates presented in Ball (1998) and
Ireland (2009).
These estimates suggest that there is significant variation in the behaviour
of money demand, as compared to longer run estimates presented in Lucas
(1980), Ball (1998), Ireland (2009) and Stock and Watson (1993). Evidence
from subsamples suggests that a time-varying money demand curve better elu-
cidates the behaviour during each decade, which supports the main hypothesis
presented in Cogley (1993). Moreover, similar to Sargent and Surico (2011),
the behaviour of money demand seems to have changed after 1982, suggesting
a strong liquidity effect and a strong relationship between nominal money and
inflation.
3.2. Determinacy Under Time-Varying
Objectives
To assess the likelihood of determinacy during the Great Inflation, I feed the
estimated policy and money demand parameters into the parameterized model
introduced in section 2. I rely on numerical solutions, which allow me to com-
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pute the likelihood of determinacy based on the complete span of standard
errors of the policy parameters. From a distribution of the estimated pa-
rameters, 10,000 draws are computed, and the fraction of draws that yield
a determinate rational expectation equilibrium is calculated.18 To identify
the contribution of the two channels that affect determinacy in the model, I
also present determinacy regions under multiple specifications of the reaction
function and the money demand equation.
Figure 6 summarizes the determinacy periods computed using the esti-
mated policy parameters, under the baseline parameterization of the model.
My estimates suggest that the likelihood of determinacy was below 50% from
July 1970 through to January 1976, and from March 1978 through to October
1982. The high likelihood of determinacy during the first few months of the
1970s suggests that the policy pursued by the FOMC during this period was
contractionary. This is similar to the results suggested by Boivin (2005) and
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). However, unlike their paper, my frame-
work suggests that the gradual influence of money growth objectives from
the mid-1970s resulted in equilibrium indeterminacy, and once this policy was
abandoned around late 1974 the economy drifted back to a determinate equi-
librium. From 1975 through to 1978, the economy is estimated to be (weakly)
determinate. Furthermore, the change in policy procedures in favour of money
growth targeting towards the end of the 1970s shifted the economy back into
the indeterminacy region. Finally, the terminal indeterminacy dates in 1982
point to a change in monetary policy objectives, as money growth becomes
statistically insignificant in the policy rule. Therefore, the change in policy
procedures under Chairman Volcker results in a shift from indeterminacy to
determinacy in my baseline characterization of the determinacy regions.
To isolate the contribution of the response to inflation on price level deter-
minacy during this period, I set the weight on money growth equal to zero,
and use the estimated policy rule to compute the likelihood of determinacy.
As expected, the likelihood of indeterminacy shrinks to a region representing
18A detailed discussion of this methodology is contained in Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) and will not be repeated here.
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only the time period from October 1970 through to March 1972. This is be-
cause conditional on the estimated response towards inflation, monetary policy
could have been characterized as weakly active and price level disequilibrium
would have only occurred when the Taylor principle was not satisfied.19 In this
setting, the weak response to money growth mitigated the relatively strong re-
sponse to inflation and played an important role in triggering and sustaining
price level indeterminacy.
I also compare the contribution of a high parameterization of the response
to inflation for the likelihood of determinacy, while at the same time use the
estimated response to money growth. Under this scenario, the likelihood of
the U.S. economy being indeterminate never falls below 80% for the entire
sample. This result is in line with the determinacy conditions derived in the
first half of the paper, as the estimated weak response to money growth could
have been mitigated had the response to inflation been stronger, over and
above the Taylor principle. Therefore, under the baseline parameterization,
the U.S. economy would be determinate had the Fed’s reaction function not
included a money growth objective conditional on the estimated response to
inflation, or it had responded sufficiently strongly to inflation, conditional on
the estimated response to money growth.
19Potentially one can even ignore this period, since it has been argued that a unique
equilibrium survives if the Taylor rule is sufficiently active when the economy is in the
active policy regime or if the expected length of time the economy will be in the non-active
policy regime is sufficiently small (Davig and Leeper (2005)).
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Figure 6: Baseline determinacy rates
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This figure plots the likelihood of determinacy under different policy rules based on the pa-
rameterized demand curve. The solid black line represents determinacy under the baseline
policy parameters with money growth objectives. The dotted black line presents determi-
nacy under the estimated policy rule, with the coefficient on money growth set to zero. The
solid blue line presents determinacy rates with a high parameterization of the coefficient
on inflation conditional on the estimated policy rule for output gap and money growth.
The solid red line presents determinacy conditions under this model with the estimates of
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
Since the estimated policy coefficients suggest that the monetary authority
may have switched its policy objectives multiple times during the Great In-
flation, I highlight the effect of this type of policy regime on the likelihood of
determinacy. In this setting, I compute the determinacy rates when the coeffi-
cient on money growth is significant at 5% in the policy rule. For the periods
when the coefficient on money growth enters the policy rule with less than 5%
statistical significance, I assume that the monetary authority has switched to
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a Taylor type specification.20 Based on this regime switching objective policy
rule, I calculate the corresponding determinacy rates. The likelihood rates
suggest results similar to the baseline case, and indeterminacy seems to be
prevalent in regimes where money growth objectives significantly influence the
setting of interest rates. This exercise reinforces the key point of this paper, as
the sufficiently weak response to money growth had a primary role in rendering
policy passive, despite a sufficiently strong response to inflation.
20This may also loosely imply that during the periods when money growth was not sig-
nificant at 5%, the FOMC assigned a weight of zero to money growth objectives. One could
potentially repeat this exercise for money growth significant at 10% in the policy rule. How-
ever, beyond the money growth being statistically significant at 5% in the policy rule, the
coefficient on money growth is only significant at 10% for a few periods. Therefore, I use
the estimates when it is significant at 5%.
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Figure 7: Determinacy rates under regime specific policy rule
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This figure plots the likelihood of determinacy under the regime switching type policy rule.
The top panel presents the likelihood of determinacy, considering only the case when mon-
etary aggregates are statistically significant at 5% in the policy rule. The second and third
panel compares this likelihood with interest rates and inflation during this period.
Lastly, in order to isolate the contribution of the behaviour of money de-
mand to price equilibrium determinacy, I replace the parameterized money
demand parameters in the previous setting with the estimated money demand
parameters. I use estimates of the money demand for the 1970 through to
1979 period.21 Since the relationship between nominal money and inflation
is marginally weaker in the estimated money demand relationship, the inde-
terminacy region shrinks slightly, and suggests an indeterminate equilibrium
from September 1970 through to July 1975, and from May 1978 through to
October 1980. This result prompts a number of interesting conclusions related
21Specifically, I use ηpi= 0.58, ηy = 0.70 and ηi = 0.70.
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to the indeterminacy periods during the Great Inflation. First, my estimates
strongly suggest that indeterminacy under a money growth objective was pri-
marily driven by the choice of monetary policy, compared to the minor role
played by the relationship between nominal money and inflation. Second, the
U.S. economy is estimated to have shifted to a determinate equilibrium to-
wards the end of 1980. This period corresponds with the observation made
in Boivin (2005) as most of the changes in monetary policy seems to have
occurred during the 1980s, and not in 1979, as is often assumed. These results
are summarized in table 3.
Table 3: Indeterminacy time periods
Policy
Baseline July 1970 - January 1976 March 1978 - October 1982
Baseline at 5% September 1970 - December 1974 April 1979 - December 1982
significance
ψ∆m = 0 October 1970 - March 1972
Money demand
Estimated 70 - 79 September 1970 - July 1975 May 1978 - October 1980
ηpi = 1 August 1970 - January 1976 March 1978 - August 1983
This table presents the time periods during which the estimated policy rule yielded an
indeterminate price equilibrium. The first column presents the role of policy parameters
based on the baseline money demand function, while the second panel focuses on money
demand parameters conditional on estimates of the policy parameters. For the money
demand equation, I use the parameters suggested by the generalized money demand
estimates.
The results with time-varying parameters confirm the key role played by
shifts in the objectives of monetary policy in accounting for the apparent tran-
sition from determinacy to indeterminacy in the early 1970s, and then back
to determinacy towards the end of the Volcker deflation, as also suggested by
Clarida et al. (1998a) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). During this
period, had the FOMC followed the type of regime espoused by Taylor (1993)
or Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), the probability of determinacy would
be approximately 99%. In this context, my estimates suggest that a gradual
abandoning of money growth objectives in favour of a Taylor type specification
during the 1980s may have switched monetary policy from passive to active,
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and assisted in yielding a determinate price equilibrium. Contrary to the find-
ings presented in Orphanides (2002), these results point to a large variation
in the policy parameters that led to an indeterminate equilibrium during the
1970s and 1980s. My estimates also suggest that the idea that U.S. economic
history can be divided into pre- and post- Volcker turns out to be mislead-
ing, since there are multiple regimes where monetary policy is estimated to
be passive, resulting in price level indeterminacy (see, for example, Sims and
Zha (2006), Bianchi (2012) and Lubik et al. (2014)). Broadly speaking, pursu-
ing a money growth objective may have activated money demand instability
(Sargent and Surico (2011)), which may affect the likelihood of indeterminacy
as implied by my theoretical conditions, but empirical estimates suggest that
this effect is not sufficient to have a large effect on the likelihood of indeter-
minacy, which was predominantly affected by the nature of policy pursued by
the monetary authority.
3.3. Volatility, Welfare and Counterfactuals
I now analyze the consequences for volatility and welfare that are due to the
FOMC pursuing money growth objectives during the Great Inflation. This
exercise is motivated by empirical evidence from Perez-Quiros and McConnell
(2000), who identify a large decline in the volatility of aggregate economic
activity, employment and inflation since the early 1980s. Previous studies offer
several potential explanations for this ‘Great Moderation’. Some studies point
to evidence that output volatility fell more than sales volatility and highlight
the potential role of better inventory control methods (see, for example, Kahn
et al. (2002)). Another line of research stresses ‘good luck’ in the form of
smaller exogenous shocks (see, for example, Stock and Watson (2002)). The
last explanation is based on ‘better’ monetary policy, which examines the
contribution of changes in monetary policy to the reduction in macroeconomic
volatility (see, for example, Clarida et al. (1998a)).22
22Summers (2005) perform a cross country analysis which confirms the role of monetary
policy in reducing the macroeconomic volatility across countries.
36
To assess the contribution of the role of the monetary policy reaction func-
tion on economic volatility, I compare the volatility generated by the esti-
mated policy reaction function with volatility generated under alternative pol-
icy rules. In particular, I compare the estimated policy rule with parame-
ters of the specification presented in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), a
standard Taylor rule, and a constant money growth rule. To differentiate
the macroeconomic consequences of the actual policy during this period with
macroeconomic volatility under (hypothetical) ‘better’ policy, I perform policy
counterfactuals by combining the coefficients of the baseline Taylor rule with
a positive coefficient on money growth. For each type of policy rule, welfare
loss to steady state consumption is computed using the welfare loss function
presented in Galí (2009). I use point estimates for the reaction function, which
is calculated by averaging the response in the policy rule during the 1970 to
1979 time period. Table 4 summarizes the results.
Table 4: Estimates of volatility and welfare
1970 - 1979 Policy counterfactuals
M.T Taylor CG ∆mt = 0 M.T - I M.T - II M.T - III
ψpi 1.35 1.5 1.59 - - - 1.5
ψ∆m -0.18 - - - 1.5 1.5 0.5
ψgy - - 0.39 - - -
ψx 0.18 0.125 0.41 - - 0.125 0.125
ρ1 0.67 - 0.75 - - - -
ρ2 -0.22 - -0.27 - - - -
σ(pi) 3.03 1.76 2.09 2.5 3.74 3.10 1.37
σ(x) 1.39 0.92 1.01 1.19 1.74 1.48 0.98
σ(gy) 1.34 0.78 0.78 0.73 1.02 0.92 0.70
Welfare Loss 1.62 0.55 0.77 1.10 2.47 1.70 0.33
The table presents point estimates of the volatility in inflation, output gap, output growth,
interest rates, money growth, and the corresponding welfare losses under each type of
monetary policy rule. Here M.T denotes monetary policy under the baseline monetary
aggregate targeting rule and CG refers to the rule espoused by Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011). The last three columns present policy counterfactuals. Since output gap is
quarterly, the response to output gap under M.T and CG is converted to a quarterly rate
for this exercise. I use the baseline parameterization for the structural model.
Conditional on the baseline parameterization of the model, the actual pol-
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icy adopted by the FOMC is estimated to have contributed significantly to
macroeconomic volatility. Under the baseline policy rule, a negative weight on
money growth mitigates the response of interest rates to inflation.23 Based on
this policy, the aggregate response of the central bank to a structural shock
is lower, compared to the rise in interest rates suggested by a Taylor type
policy rule.24 In this context, compared to a baseline Taylor type policy rule,
inflation is estimated to be 42% more volatile, the output gap is 33% more
volatile, and output growth is 41% more volatile. Therefore, this policy results
in welfare losses of more than 1.07% of steady state consumption compared
to a Taylor type specification. A comparison of the actual policy rule with
the baseline Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) type policy specification sug-
gests 32% higher inflation volatility, 27% more output gap volatility, and 41%
higher output growth volatility, resulting in welfare losses of more than 0.85%
of steady state consumption. This is because responding to the output growth
rate effectively makes the policy reaction function history dependent. Pursu-
ing only money growth objectives makes the policy too accommodating and
yields a welfare outcome similiar to a constant money growth rule. Finally,
comparing the hypothetical ‘good policy’ in the form of a Taylor rule plus a
positive weight on money growth results in an equilibrium outcome that sug-
gests welfare gains of 0.22% of steady state consumption over and above a
Taylor rule. Under this type of rule, the aggregate response of the monetary
authority to changes in inflation is greater, and the policy induces interest rate
inertia and history dependence.
To capture the contribution of just monetary growth objectives to macroe-
conomic volatility, I parameterize the monetary policy rule with the parameters
presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), but include the estimates
of the coefficients on money growth. This policy rule still generates 13%
additional output growth volatility, 11% additional inflation volatility, and
23As shown in the appendix, one can replace money growth in the policy rule with the
generalized money demand curve. In that case the coefficient on money growth affects the
response to inflation, output gap and lagged interest rates.
24Under the Taylor rule the monetary authority would raise interest rates, cause a reces-
sion, and keep inflation close to its long run target.
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30% additional output gap volatility. Therefore, a weak response to money
growth despite an otherwise aggressive monetary policy rule still contributes
to macroeconomic volatility. Table 5 summarizes these results.
Table 5: Estimate of counterfactual volatility
σ(pi) σ(x) σ(gy)
Baseline 3.03 1.39 1.34
CG 2.09 1.01 0.78
CG with M.T 2.38 1.15 1.13
Excess 12% 12% 30%
The table presents counterfactual estimates of the policy rule. The first row presents baseline
estimates of volatility, the second row (‘CG’) presents estimates of volatility from the Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) type rule, while the third row (‘CG with M.T’) presents estimates
of volatility given the parameters under Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) rule with money
growth from the actual estimated sample. The last column presents the excess volatility
contributed by pursuing a money growth objective.
My results strongly suggest that a sizeable portion of the reduction in
macroeconomic volatility during the 1970s could be attributed to loose mone-
tary policy, and support the evidence proposed by Roberts (2006), Leduc and
Sill (2007) and Taylor (2013). Since the negative weight on money growth
is incompatible with the response of the monetary authority to inflation, the
model predicts large welfare losses under the parameterized model. These re-
sults provide compelling welfare based reasons for the FOMC abandoning its
attempt to use money growth as an objective of policy, and focusing on fol-
lowing a Taylor type policy rule. This also supports my empirical evidence,
as the interest rates based on the Taylor rule are shown to better match ac-
tual interest rates from the 1980s. Last, policy counterfactuals suggest that
a sufficiently strong response to money growth yields welfare outcomes supe-
rior to any other policy rule, since it induces interest rate inertia and history
dependence, which are, as suggested by Woodford (2011), hallmarks of good
policy.
39
4. International Evidence of Monetary
Growth Targeting
Based on the parameterized structure of the economy and the structural
shocks, a weak response to money growth objectives is estimated to have
contributed to macroeconomic volatility in the U.S. An important outcome
from analyzing the U.S. case suggests that there may be positive welfare gains
to be made from switching to a speed-limit policy, or to a standard Taylor
type specification. Alternatively, pursuing money growth objectives sincerely,
by responding sufficiently strongly to growth in money, could result in positive
welfare gains. In this context, it may be reasonable to examine the robustness
of the relationship between pursuing monetary growth objectives and macroe-
conomic volatility across countries. In general, I want to compare macroeco-
nomic volatility for countries that focus on pursuing inflation objectives with
countries that pursue money growth objectives equivalent to the U.S. Coun-
tries that pursue both inflation and money growth objectives are categorized
according to statistical significance. Therefore, if the estimates suggest that
the weight on money growth is significant, and the coefficient on inflation is
also significant, the country is categorized as a ‘money growth targeter’. A
country that only targets inflation is categorized as an ‘inflation targeter’.
In this spirit, I estimate the baseline constant parameter policy rule pre-
sented in this paper for all available countries from 1970 through to 2006 using
the World Bank database. Countries that have many missing observations or
do not pursue any of these types of policies are excluded from the sample.
The final dataset consists of thirty-four countries, for which I have data on
inflation, output growth, money supply (M1), and interest rates. Based on
the estimates of the policy rule, I split the sample into countries that pursued
money growth objectives equivalent to the U.S. case, and countries that pur-
sued inflation objectives. I use least squares to estimate this policy rule. I
then calculate inflation and output volatility for both sets of countries, and
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take the average for that category.25 Table 6 summarizes my results.
Table 6: Cross-country estimates of the reaction function
Money growth targeters Inflation targeters
Country Output Inflation Country Output Inflation
volatility volatility volatility volatility
Australia 1.68 4.18 Bangladesh 1.42 7.03
Barbados 3.74 5.28 Belize 4.18 3.48
Benin 4.2 5.92 Canada 1.99 3.56
Burkina Faso 3.8 6.66 China 2.89 5.2
El Salvador 2.31 3.06 Denmark 1.77 2.97
Honduras 2.65 8.96 Egypt 2.87 6.72
Mali 6.4 7.16 Finland 2.80 3.49
Norway 1.64 4.42 Hungary 4.16 9.7
Singapore 3.73 3.16 India 2.90 3.20
South Africa 2.33 4.54 Japan 2.52 5.56
Sri Lanka 1.82 4.89 Kenya 4.44 8.27
Thailand 4.32 3.16 Korea 3.89 5.03
Zimbabwe 3.57 9.9 Lesotho 2.43 8.42
Italy 1.42 5.67 Morocco 4.60 4.17
Paraguay 2.66 8.17
Philippines 3.52 9.11
Sweden 1.85 3.91
Switzerland 1.57 1.92
United Kingdom 1.57 5.83
United States 1.94 2.48
Average 3.52 5.50 2.86 5.40
The table presents macroeconomic volatility in countries which target money and countries
which target only inflation. The data covers the period 1970 through to 2006. The volatility
of each variable is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the sample.
My estimates provide a novel insight into monetary policy regimes across
countries. First, I find that out of the thirty-four countries in the data sam-
25For robustness I also estimate this rule for all countries from 1960 through to 2006, 1980
through to 2006 and 1990 through to 2006 but my main results do not change.
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ple, fourteen countries pursued money growth objectives, and twenty coun-
tries pursued inflation objectives from 1970 through to 2006. Comparing the
macroeconomic volatility of these two samples suggests that countries that
focused on achieving their money growth objectives also, on average, experi-
enced more inflation and output volatility. This is consistent with the evidence
discussed in this paper, as pursuing money growth objectives is estimated to
contribute significantly to macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, some of these
countries are also estimated to place a statistically significant negative weight
on money, suggesting that these countries may be faced with price indeter-
minacy issues similar to those experienced by the U.S. economy during the
1970s. As suggested by the model, there should be positive welfare gains from
switching to a Taylor type policy in countries that continue to target money
growth.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I study the role of money growth as an objective of monetary
policy by examining its contribution to price level determinacy. Specifically,
I apply this framework to analyze the rise in macroeconomic instability expe-
rienced by the U.S economy during the 1960s and 1970s. In my framework,
policy mistakes in the form of a weak response to money growth triggered
indeterminacy, despite a relatively strong response to inflation. Therefore, my
results suggest the reduction in macroeconomic instability during the 1980s
could be largely attributed to the FOMC relinquishing money growth M1
objectives. These findings present a novel channel that provides additional
support for the well-known view that changes in monetary policy may have
played an important role during the Great Inflation.
To examine the effect on price equilibrium when the monetary policy rule
includes money growth as an objective, I derive novel determinacy conditions
that depend on monetary policy coefficients, and on the behaviour of the
money demand curve. I show that instability in the traditional money de-
42
mand relationships or a weak response to money growth triggers indetermi-
nacy, irrespective of the Taylor principle being satisfied. In this case, it may
be desirable for the central bank to switch to an inflation-targeting regime in
order to guarantee determinacy. In general, these results contribute to the
theoretical literature which has focused only on the response towards inflation
as a pre-requisite of active policy (see for example Friedman (2000), Wood-
ford (2001) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003)). Using extended FOMC data
on monetary growth M1, I provide novel empirical evidence of changes in the
objectives of monetary policy, as money growth is shown to have significantly
influenced the setting of interest rates during the first half of the 1970s, and
during Volcker’s deflation. These empirical results extend the evidence pro-
vided in Burns (1987), and Sims and Zha (2006), and contribute to the findings
of Benati and Mumtaz (2007), Friedman (1996), and Clarida et al. (1998b).
My central findings suggest that the US economy experienced indeterminacy
from 1970 through to 1976, and then from 1978 through to October 1980, be-
fore finally moving to a determinate equilibrium, supporting the implications
put forward by Clarida et al. (1998a), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
However, in my framework, a weak response to money growth mitigates the
relatively strong response to inflation, rendering policy passive. I show that
the choice of monetary policy seems to be the primary factor driving price level
indeterminacy, with the estimated money demand instability playing a minor
role in the empirical characterization of determinacy. Generally, character-
izing monetary policy in pre-and-post-Volcker terms seems to be misleading,
since multiple policy regimes appear to have been in place during the 1970s.
This supports the hypothesis suggested by Sims and Zha (2006) and Bianchi
(2012).
My counterfactual simulations suggest that substantial welfare gains could
be realized if the monetary authority switches from the estimated policy rule
to a Taylor type specification. This formalizes welfare-based evidence of the
gradual departure of money growth from monetary policy deliberations. I
confirm the correlation between countries that pursue money growth objectives
similar to the U.S. and high macroeconomic volatility, using cross-country
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data.
Even though the M1 experiment was abandoned during the 1980s, my re-
sults may have relevant policy implications. The current state of the economy
suggests an unprecedented growth in liquidity. In this environment, central
banks may be tempted to (re)introduce money supply as an objective of policy,
or as a possible indicator of long run inflation. Due to the possibility of induc-
ing sunspot equilibrium, and therefore causing macroeconomic instability, my
results call for caution in using this type of policy. Although instability in the
money demand function plays a minor role in pinning down indeterminacy in
my framework, further research is needed to fully understand the drivers of
the parameters of the demand curve. Future work may include treating these
drivers as endogenous in an empirical and theoretical model.
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A. For Online Publication
A.1. Robustness
Table 1: NLS/IV estimates
NLS IV
Parameter (1) (2) (1) (2)
ψpi 0.75
∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.64 0.60
(0.27) (0.27) (0.37) (0.39)
ψx 0.38
∗∗ 0.36∗ 0.3∗ 0.27∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
ψ∆m − −0.03 −0.22 -0.55
− (0.02) (0.20) (0.53)
ρ1 1.03
∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
ρ2 −0.17 −0.17 −0.18 −0.18
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
d2,t 0.52 0.59 0.51 0.43
(0.32) (0.32) (0.25) (0.25)
ρ1 + ρ2 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88
p− value − − 0.12 0.18
This table presents NLS and IV estimates of the baseline feedback rule. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The set of instruments are lags of inflation, output gap, the federal
funds rate and growth in monetary aggregate M1. The bold letters are the instrumented
variables. The bottom panel reports the p-value associated with a test of the models over
identifying restrictions (Hausman). For the baseline version, I include a time dummy for
the 1979- 1982 period. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 denote significance levels.
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Table 3: NLS/IV estimates
My TV estimates suggest that the Fed targeted money supply from 1970 -
1974, and 1979 - 1987. In order to capture these shifts, I use the exact time
period implied by the TV estimates and test for changes using dummies, as
also used by Boivin (2005). My estimated rule then becomes:
it = ρ1,tit−1+ρ2,tit−2+(1−ρ1,t−ρ2,t)[(ψpi,t+d1,t)pit+(ψx,t+d1,t)xt+(ψm,t+d1,t)∆mnt ]+ct+t
(22)
d1,t =
{
1 1970− 1974, 1979− 1981
0 otherwise
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NLS IV
Parameter (1) (2) (1) (2)
ψpi 0.73
∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.46 0.50∗
(0.24) (0.15) (0.25) (0.24)
ψx 0.23
∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.13 0.39∗
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
ψ∆m − 0.03 − 1.06
− (0.03) − (0.72)
d1,tψ∆m − −0.17∗∗ − −1.36∗
− (0.05) − (0.67)
d1,tψpi 0.67 1.03
∗ 0.41 1.09∗
(0.51) (0.41) (0.41) (0.55)
d1,tψx 0.51 −0.001 0.28 −0.32
(0.43) (0.32) (0.35) (0.44)
ρ1 1.02
∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
ρ2 −0.14 −0.14 −0.15 −0.17
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
ρ1 + ρ2 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.83
p− value − − 0.22 0.21
This table presents NLS and IV estimates of the baseline feedback rule. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The set of instruments are lags of inflation, output gap, the federal
funds rate and growth in monetary aggregate M1. The bold letters are the instrumented
variables. The bottom panel reports the p-value associated with a test of the models over
identifying restrictions (Hausman). For the baseline version, I include a time dummy for
the 1979- 1982 period. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 denote significance levels.
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A.2. Proof of determinacy condition
Proof of proposition 1. In this section I consider the contemporaneous
version of the model presented in the section, and find the determinacy condi-
tion of the policy rule with money growth. The baseline model and the policy
rule are summarized by the following equations:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + gt (23)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + ut (24)
∆mt = ηpipit + ηx∆xt − ηi∆it + ηx∆ynt + τt (25)
it = ρ1it−1 + ρ2it−2 + (1− ρ1 − ρ2)[ψpipit + ψxxt + ψm∆mnt ] + ct + t (26)
First, by substituting the money demand equation in the monetary policy rule,
we can simplify the monetary policy rule and write it in the following form:
it = δ1it−1 + δ2it−2 + δ3pit + δ4xt + δ5xt−1 (27)
where:
δ1 =
ρ1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2) δ2 =
ρ2
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
δ3 =
(1− ρ1 − ρ2)(ψpi + ηpiψ∆m)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2) δ4 =
(ηxψ∆m + ψx)(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
δ5 = − ηxψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
1 + ηiψ∆m(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
We can write the model in the following compact state space form:
Azt+1 = Bzt + Cvt (28)
and the matrices A,B are composed of structural parameters, and monetary
policy parameters, and C is a matrix of exogenous variables. The vector
zt+1 is composed of the variables [xt+1, pit+1, xt, it, it−1] which contain two non-
54
predetermined variables and three predetermined variables. Thus, if two of
the generalized eigenvalues lie outside the unit circle, then the system has a
unique solution (proposition 1 in Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). Alternately,
rational expectations equilibrium is determinate if and only if three of the
eigenvalues are inside the unit circle. The characteristic polynomial is given
by p(λ) = a5λ5 + a4λ4 + a3λ3 + a2λ2 + a1λ + a0. In this case, define p(1) =
1 + a4 + a3 + a2 + a1 + a0 and p(−1) = −1 + a4 − a3 + a2 − a1 + a0. This is
given by the following two conditions:
p(1) = (βσ)−1((δ4 + δ5)(1− β) + κ(δ3 − 1) + (δ1 + δ2)κ) (29)
p(−1) = −(βσ)−1((δ4 − δ5)(1 + β) + κδ3 + (δ1 − δ2 + 1)(κ+ 2σ + 2βσ)) (30)
Conditions (C.13) and (C.14) in Woodford (2011) are necessary for both Cases
II and III (and they also rule out Case I). These two conditions are that
p(1) > 0 and p(−1) < 0. Notice that when ηi ≥ 0, the following condition is
sufficient for determinacy, since it applies condition 30.
|(βσ)−1((δ4 + δ5)(1− β) + κ(δ3 − 1) + (δ1 + δ2)κ)| > 0 (31)
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